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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Office of Policy Planning
Bureau of Competition
Bureau of Economics

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Patrick C. Lynch
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Juan M. Pichardo
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State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
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Dear General Lynch and Deputy Majority Leader Pichardo,

The staffs of the Federal Trade Commission's Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics are pleased to respond to your requests for comments on the competitive effects of seven Rhode Island bills (the "Bills").¹ Although the Bills differ in their details, all include so-called "freedom of choice" provisions for patients who require pharmaceutical services, and "any willing provider" provisions directed at health insurers and employee benefit plans that contract with pharmacies. Each of the Bills limits the ability of health insurers and employee benefit plans to restrict the "freedom of choice" of consumers in selecting where they will obtain pharmaceutical services, and the ability of health insurers and employee benefit plans to contract selectively with pharmacies in Rhode Island. Instead, health insurers and employee benefit plans must ensure "freedom of choice" for consumers among all sources of pharmaceutical services in Rhode Island, and include in their networks any pharmacy that is willing to accept the terms that are offered. In separate letters, you asked us to analyze

¹ This letter expresses the views of the FTC's Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics. The letter does not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or of any individual Commissioner. The Commission has, however, voted to authorize us to submit these comments. The specific General Assembly Bills are 2004-H 7042, 2004-H 7047, 2004-H 7129, 2004-H 7131, 2004-H 7417, 2004-S 2015, and 2004-S 2140. We note that the Bills were introduced after the U.S. District Court declined to find Blue Cross' restricted network for the delivery of pharmaceutical services in Rhode Island a violation of the antitrust laws. *See Stop & Shop Supermarket v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island*, 239 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. R.I. 2003).

these bills, and particularly to discuss the bills’ “impact on prices to consumers,” “cost-benefit tradeoff,” and “possible competitive effects.”

Although several of the Bills recite that they are intended to maximize competition and assure greater “freedom of choice,” we believe that, if enacted, any of the bills would likely have the unintended consequences of limiting competition, undermining freedom of choice, and increasing the costs of pharmaceutical services. Of course, to the extent that these prices rise, they would also have the effect of increasing health insurance prices and restricting the availability of insurance – exactly the opposite of the Bills’ intent.

Interest and Experience of the Federal Trade Commission

The FTC is charged by statute with preventing unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.² Under this statutory mandate, the Commission seeks to identify business practices and regulations that impede competition without offering countervailing benefits to consumers. For decades, the Commission and its staff have investigated the competitive effects of restrictions on the business practices of health care providers.³ In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Commission staff commented on similar “any willing provider” and “freedom of choice” bills in other states.⁴ In addition, the recent joint FTC / DOJ health care hearings included testimony regarding the impact of any willing provider and freedom of choice statutes.⁵

Competition among third party payers and health care providers can enhance the range of services available to consumers and reduce health care costs. The Commission has noted that the use of limited panels of health care providers has been an effective means of promoting competition and lowering the price of health care services.⁶ The Commission has accordingly

² Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

³ See, e.g., FTC Antitrust Actions in Health Care Services and Products, <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hcupdate031024.pdf>; FTC Antitrust Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products, <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0310rxupdate.pdf>.

⁴ The specific states were Massachusetts (letter from Bureau of Competition to Representative John C. Bartley (May 30, 1989)), New Hampshire (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to Paul J. Alfano (March 17, 1992)), California (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to Senator Patrick Johnston (June 26, 1992)), Montana (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to Montana Attorney General Joseph P. Mazurek (February 4, 1993)), New Jersey (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to New Jersey Assemblyman E. Scott Garrett (March 29, 1993)), Pennsylvania (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to Pennsylvania Senator Roger Madigan (April 19, 1993)), and South Carolina (letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to Representative Thomas C. Alexander (May 10, 1993)). letter from Bureau of Competition to David A. Gates, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Nevada (November 5, 1986).

⁵ See, e.g., Transcript of Health Care Hearings 153-57 (June 10, 2003), at <http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/030610ftctrans.pdf>.

⁶ See, e.g., FTC, Statement of Enforcement Policy With Respect to Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48982, 48984 (October 5, 1981); Statement of George W. Douglas, Commissioner, On Behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the

taken law enforcement action against anticompetitive efforts to suppress or eliminate health care programs that use selective contracting to create a limited panel of health care providers.⁷ FTC staff has also submitted comments to government bodies about the competitive effects of various regulatory proposals to restrict selective contracting. Two of these comments addressed “any willing provider/freedom of choice” requirements for pharmacies.⁸

Description of Proposals

All of the Bills require health insurers and employee benefit plans to ensure “freedom of choice” to consumers, and to include in their network of providers any pharmacy that is willing to participate on the terms that are offered to other network pharmacies. Several of the Bills also specify procedural requirements that health insurers and employee benefit plans must satisfy before they can create a pharmacy network, or require the Department of Health to develop rules and regulations to ensure “fair and competitive bidding.” Six of the seven Bills (all but 2004-S 2140) would prohibit mail order pharmacies from being included in these pharmacy networks.

Competitive Importance of Selective Contracting

Over the last thirty years, financing and delivery programs that provide health care services through a limited panel of health care providers have proliferated. Virtually all private insurers offer limited-panel programs of one sort or another, and the majority of privately insured Americans now are enrolled in such plans.⁹ These arrangements developed in response to the rising costs associated with traditional fee-for-service health care. The programs, which include such disparate organizational forms as HMOs, preferred provider panels, and point of service plans, typically involve contractual agreements between the payer and participating health care providers that limit, at least to some degree, the patient’s choice of provider for covered services.

Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, on H.R. 2956: The Preferred Provider Health Care Act of 1983 at 2-3 (October 24, 1983); Health Care Management Associates, 101 F.T.C. 1014, 1016 (1983) (advisory opinion). *See also* Bureau of Economics, FTC, Staff Report on the Health Maintenance Organization and Its Effects on Competition (1977).

⁷ *See, e.g.*, Medical Service Corp. of Spokane County, 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976); American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), *aff’d as modified*, 638 F.2d. 443 (2d Cir. 1980), *aff’d by an equally divided court*, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); Forbes Health System Medical Staff, 94 F.T.C. 1042 (1979); Medical Staff of Doctors’ Hospital of Price George’s County, 110 F.T.C. 476 (1988); Eugene M. Addison, M.D., 111 F.T.C. 339 (1988); Medical Staff of Holy Cross Hospital, No. C-3345 (consent order, Sept. 10, 1991); Medical Staff of Broward General Medical Center, No. C-3344 (consent order, Sept. 10, 1991). *See also* American Society of Anesthesiologists, 93 F.T.C. 101 (1979); Sherman A. Hope. M.D., 98 F.T.C. 58 (1981).

⁸ *See* letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to California Senator Patrick Johnston (June 26, 1992) and letter from Office of Consumer and Competition Advocacy to New Jersey Assemblyman E. Scott Garrett (March 29, 1993).

⁹ In 2003, approximately 172 million Americans were insured by commercial health plans. Of these, approximately 156 million were enrolled in either PPO or HMO plans. *See* <http://www.mcareol.com/factshts/mcolfact.htm>.

An abundance of empirical evidence now exists demonstrating that, other things equal, selective contracting increases the intensity of competition among providers, which is manifested in lower prices paid by insurers to providers. The competition's intensity increases with the number of providers in the relevant market, and with the restrictiveness of the insurance contracts found in the market (i.e., HMOs, which have more limited panels than PPOs, induce more intense price competition among providers than would PPOs of equivalent size).¹⁰ These findings conform to economic theory. When insurers have a credible threat to exclude providers from their networks and channel patients elsewhere, providers have a powerful incentive to bid aggressively. Inclusion in a restricted panel offers the provider the prospect of substantially increased sales opportunities. Without such credible threats, however, providers have less incentive to bid aggressively, and even managed care organizations with large market shares may have less ability to obtain low prices.¹¹

Restricted provider panels may also lower costs through greater efficiency, because higher sales volumes may allow the provider to lower its unit costs. In the case of pharmacies, for example, a preferential or exclusive arrangement may allow a pharmacy to enjoy economies of scale from spreading fixed costs over a larger volume of sales, and the arrangement may facilitate better business planning by making its sales volume more predictable. Moreover, payers may seek to limit the number of pharmacies with which they contract not only to induce more aggressive price competition among pharmacies, but also because their administrative costs might be lower for a limited-panel program than for one requiring the payer to deal with, and make payments to, all or most of the pharmacies doing business in a program's service area.

Competition among plans offering different arrangements for providing pharmacy services (including competition between plans that limit pharmacy participation and plans that do not), would tend to ensure that the gains from these cost savings will benefit consumers of health care services, either through lower premiums for health insurance, lower out-of-pocket costs (for that portion of health care expenditures borne directly by consumers through deductibles and co-payments), or improved services.¹²

¹⁰ See Morrisey, "Competition in Hospital and Health Insurance Markets: A Review and Research Agenda," *Health Services Research* 36 (2001), 191-221, for a review of this literature. By statute, the Commission has no jurisdiction over the business of insurance.

¹¹ See, e.g., Sorensen, "Insurer-Hospital Bargaining: Negotiated Discounts in Post-Deregulation Connecticut," *Journal of Industrial Economics* 51 (2003), 469-90 ("ability of insurers to obtain discounts determined primarily by ability of insurer to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated"); Ellison and Snyder, "Countervailing Power in Wholesale Pharmaceuticals," MIT Working Paper 01-27 July 2001 ("buyers of wholesale drugs that can use restrictive formularies obtain substantially lower prices than buyers without this ability"); Staten et al. "Market Share and the Illusion of Power: Can Blue Cross Force Hospitals to Discount?," *Journal of Health Economics* (1987), 43-58 ("Blue Cross obtained substantial discounts only when it had numerous hospitals with which to potentially contract").

¹² See, e.g., Wholey et al., "The Effect of Market Structure on HMO Premiums," *Journal of Health Economics* 14 (1995), 81-106 ("more competition, measured by the number of HMOs in the market area, reduces HMO premiums"). Reductions in the premiums borne by the employer ultimately can also benefit employees in the form of wage increases. When employers bear higher nonwage employment costs (e.g., because they are compelled by law to offer higher cost health benefits), both theory and empirical evidence show that the costs of these benefits are

Whether explicitly or implicitly, all of the bills emphasize the importance of ensuring broad access to pharmacy services for all consumers. Not all consumers, however, will necessarily desire such broad access if this expanded access is costly. Many employers offer a choice between higher cost, higher benefit plans, and lower cost, lower benefit plans, and many employees choose the latter.¹³ Consumer preference for such programs presumably means that, in at least some consumers' view, the advantages of lower premiums and/or lower out-of-pocket costs outweigh the disadvantages of limiting the choice of provider.

Limitations on choice are unlikely to be so severe that consumers' access to pharmacy services is inadequate. Just as competitive forces encourage pharmacies to offer their best price and service combination to a payer to gain access to its subscribers, competition also encourages payers (and employers) to establish pharmacy service arrangements that offer the level of accessibility that subscribers prefer.

Effects of “Any Willing Provider” Provisions

The Bills effectively preclude exclusive contracts between payers and a restricted panel of pharmacies. From the perspective of a pharmacy negotiating the terms on which it is willing to deal with health insurers and employee benefit plans, this means that a pharmacy has no contract-based expectation of obtaining a substantial portion of the subscribers' business, and faces no threat of sales losses if it fails to bid aggressively for inclusion in payers' networks. Because any pharmacy would be entitled to contract on the same terms as all other pharmacies, there would be little incentive for pharmacies to compete in developing attractive or innovative proposals. Because all other pharmacies can “free ride” on a successful proposal formulation, innovative providers may be unwilling to bear the costs of developing a proposal. Thus “any willing provider” requirements may substantially reduce competition among pharmacies.¹⁴

Moreover, requiring “freedom of choice” and compelling programs to be open to any willing provider may not give consumers any additional choices, if consumers may already choose among multiple health insurance offerings – some with restricted pharmacy services and others with more expansive pharmacy benefits. Indeed, such strategies may actually reduce the

ultimately borne by workers in the form of lower wages. *See, e.g.*, Gruber, “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” *American Economic Review* 84 (1994), 622-41 (“the cost of state and federal mandates stipulating that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans resulted in lower wages for the targeted beneficiaries”).

¹³ *See, e.g.*, Scanlon, “Impact of Health Plan Report Cards on Managed Care Enrollment,” *Journal of Health Economics*, 21 (2002), 19-41; Beaulieu, “Quality Information and Consumer Health Plan Choices,” *Journal of Health Economics*, 21 (2002), 43-63 (“employees respond to information on price and quality when choosing health plans”).

¹⁴ “Any willing provider” laws therefore may have economic effects similar to “price matching” policies (whereby a seller guarantees that he will meet the best price that a buyer can obtain elsewhere). These policies, though seemingly procompetitive on their face, actually can result in higher prices because they reduce sellers' willingness to cut prices aggressively. *See, e.g.*, Edlin and Emch, “The Welfare Losses From Price-Matching Policies,” *Journal of Industrial Economics* 47 (1999), 145-67.

options available to consumers without providing any additional consumer benefit. We note also that if imposing “freedom of choice” obligations on payers raises insurers’ costs, and therefore the premiums they charge, then some employers may elect to drop health care coverage for some or all of their employees.¹⁵

Empirical evaluations of any willing provider and “freedom of choice” provisions indicate that these policies result in higher health care expenditures. One study found that states with highly restrictive any willing provider/freedom of choice laws spent approximately 2% more on healthcare than did states without such policies.¹⁶ This finding likely reflects the fact that these laws reduce the ability of insurers to offer less expensive plans with limited provider panels. This interpretation is supported by another study that found that metropolitan areas with a high intensity of any willing provider/freedom of choice regulation had HMO market shares approximately 7% lower than comparable areas without these provisions, presumably because such regulations diminished the ability of HMOs to offer cost savings.¹⁷ “Freedom of choice” provisions reduced HMO market share more than any willing provider laws.

Several scholars have noted that any willing provider and “freedom of choice” laws are more likely to appear in states with limited managed care penetration, and suggested that these provisions actually preempt competition among providers, instead of protecting the interest of patients.¹⁸ In other words, such laws appear to protect competitors, not competition or consumers.¹⁹

¹⁵ Feldman et al. estimate a high firm-level demand elasticity for health insurance (-3.91 for single coverage, -5.82 for family coverage). To translate this into marginal effects, they calculate that if monthly premiums to firms increased by \$1, the proportion of firms offering health insurance to employees would decline by almost 2 percentage points (e.g., in their sample, about 61% of firms offered insurance. A \$1 monthly increase in premiums would reduce this percentage to almost 59%). See Feldman et al. “The Effect of Premiums on the Small Firm’s Decision to Offer Health Insurance,” *Journal of Human Resources* 32 (1997), 635-58.

¹⁶ Vita, “Regulatory Restrictions on Selective Contracting: An Empirical Analysis of ‘Any Willing Provider’ Regulations,” *Journal of Health Economics*, 20 (2001), 955-966. This study controls for differences in the states’ populations, including factors such as age, ethnicity, educational background, employment background (government, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.), income, population density, and the population growth rate.

¹⁷ Morrissey & Ohsfeldt, “Do State ‘Any Willing Provider’ and ‘Freedom of Choice’ Laws Affect HMO Market Share?” *Inquiry* (2003).

¹⁸ Ohsfeldt et al., “The Spread of State Any Willing Provider Laws,” *Health Serv. Res.* (1998); Hellinger, “Any Willing Provider and Freedom of Choice Laws: An Economic Analysis,” *Health Affairs* 14:4 (1995), 297-99; Hyman, “What’s Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights,” 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 221 (2000).

¹⁹ This conclusion holds even when a single payer has market power. This payer still would have a substantial incentive to induce pharmaceutical providers to bid aggressively for inclusion in its network, as well as an incentive to pass at least some of these savings on to consumers and employers in the form of lower prices and premiums. See Bulow and Pfleiderer, “A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices,” *Journal of Political Economy* 91, 182-85 (1983) (“a monopolist will pass on some, and possibly all, of a cost reduction in the form of lower prices”). Imposing “any willing provider” or “freedom of choice” requirements on such a firm will not reduce its market power (only competition from other payers can do that), but would reduce competition among the providers with which that payer must contract. There is, therefore, no reason to believe – and there is no empirical evidence to suggest – that consumers would benefit from laws preventing that payer from contracting selectively with

Restrictions on Mail Order Pharmacies

As noted earlier, almost all of the Bills would ban mail order pharmacies from inclusion in payer networks. This restriction would almost surely reduce consumer welfare, because mail order pharmacies often offer lower prices than other retail outlets. A recent GAO study observed that “because it generally offers lower prices than retail pharmacies, mail order can be an attractive option for purchasing drugs.”²⁰ In its empirical study, the GAO study found that mail order prices typically were substantially below the prices offered by the retail pharmacies in their sample.

Conclusion

By eliminating an important form of competition in the market for pharmaceutical services, the Bills are likely to increase the cost of those services. These cost increases are likely to undermine the ability of some consumers to obtain the pharmaceutical services they need at a price they can afford. As a recent article in *Health Affairs* noted, “when costs are high, people who cannot afford something find substitutes or do without. The higher the cost of health insurance, the more people are uninsured. The higher the cost of pharmaceuticals, the more people skip doses or do not fill their prescriptions.”²¹ Although the Bills appear intended to broaden access to pharmaceutical services, there is a significant probability they will have the opposite effect.

Respectfully submitted,

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pharmaceutical providers, even in these hypothetical circumstances.

²⁰ *Prescription Drug Discount Cards*, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-912, September 2003, p. 11.

²¹ Sage, Hyman, & Greenburg, “Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care Quality” *Health Affairs*, 22:2 at 35 (March/April 2003).