
COST-SHARING CAPS DON'T SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF HIGH DRUG PRICES

Caps on Cost-Sharing Do Nothing to Hold Drug Manufacturers
Accountable for High Prices

Brand manufacturers are deflecting blame for skyrocketing drug costs by falsely claiming that high costs are a "coverage" problem that requires costsharing caps and other restrictions on plan design.

By capping patient out-of-pocket expenses, doctors and patients will inevitably choose

more expensive
brand drugs
over equally
effective lowercost generics.
This will feed
the cycle of
price increases.





Tier 3



Smart benefit design stretches the health care dollar¹


Through the use of drug tiers, health plans generally require higher out-of-pocket costs for more expensive drugs.

Cost-sharing caps disrupt the sound decision-making process plans use to provide patients with access to lower-cost — but equally effective — alternatives, including generics.

Cost-sharing caps are a windfall for brand manufacturers

Copay caps are government-set price controls that benefit brand drug manufacturers at the expense of patients and employers.


These mandates prevent payers from effectively managing drug costs, and force the public to pay more in health premiums and overall health care costs.





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Shifting costs = higher premiums



State-mandated cost-sharing caps escalate health care costs

Example: The Kentucky Department of Insurance found that cost-sharing caps would add approximately **\$13.4 million** to private market insurance premiums annually. For an average family with health coverage, these price controls would mean nearly **\$150 a year** in increased premiums.²

Example: In the state of Washington, an independent analysis found that a \$250 cost-sharing cap per 30-day script would shift costs to health plans and consumers by **\$900 million** over five years.³



- $2\ \ Kentucky\ Department\ of\ Insurance.\ (2015).\ Available\ at:\ http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/15RS/SB31/HM.pdf$
- 3 Oliver Wyman analysis for PCMA. (2016).
- 4 Ibid.

